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Melvin G. Deaile. Always at War: Organizational Culture in Strategic
Air Command, 1946-62. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018. Pp.
296.
In the classic Hollywood movie about the Strategic Air Command
(SAC), Jimmy Stewart plays Robert “Dutch” Holland, a former
Second World War bomber commander. Due to a lack of experienced
leaders in the United States Air Force (USAF), Lieutenant-Colonel
Holland is recalled to active service, but he protests having to leave
his wife and career during peacetime, asking his superior: “Where
is the fire? I just don’t see the necessity.” The General replies, “You
would if you were in my shoes. Do you realize we are the only thing
that is keeping the peace? By staying combat ready, we can prevent
a war.”1 The film’s message was clear, as it is in Melvin Deaile’s
book Always at War—SAC’s motto was “Peace Is Our Profession,”
but the price of that peace was a highly-trained and technologicallyadvanced bomber force held on a constant war footing. Though
much has been written on war planning and strategy in this period,
Deaile, an associate professor at the US Air Command and Staff
College,2 adds a fresh perspective on SAC from its 1946 founding to
its 1962 peak. As Deaile notes, “[m]ore than a simple history, [the
book] describes how an organization dominated by airmen developed
its own unique culture,” one that considered itself to already be at
war (p. 3).
The book is divided into seven chapters plus an introduction and
epilogue. The first three chapters set the stage with an overview of
the historical and ideological underpinnings of SAC. Deaile describes
how the air force formed both a subculture—derived from its
profession of the officer pilot and its technology of the airplane—and
a counterculture—stemming from its search for a coherent doctrine
that could exploit the potential of the airplane while emancipating

1  
Stewart, a veteran of bombing missions over Germany and a postwar reserve
USAF officer who rose to the rank of Brigadier-General, flew operationally the
SAC bombers featured in the film. See Strategic Air Command, DVD, directed
by Anthony Mann (Los Angeles, Paramount Pictures Corp., 1954). For more on
SAC’s use of popular culture to advance service interests, see Steve Call, Selling Air
Power: Military Aviation and American Popular Culture after World War II (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009).
2  
Colonel Deaile is also a former SAC bomber pilot and veteran of the First Gulf
War. The book is based on his 2007 doctoral dissertation.
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it from merely supporting ground forces—within the Army, of which
it was a part. Airpower theorists like Billy Mitchell provided the
doctrine of strategic bombing which held out the promise of victory in
future wars without the need for costly invasions. The Second World
War put theory into practice and saw the development of training
and tactics that increased the effectiveness of strategic bombing.
The postwar Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan (in
the latter case, where bombing was deemed particularly effective)
may not have proven that airpower could win wars, but it certainly
made a decisive contribution to victory, bolstering arguments for
a centralised air force command. The advent of the atomic bomb
and the intercontinental bomber presented the opportunity for
airpower to deter the new enemy, the Soviet Union. The Truman
administration, seeking a cost-effective counter to the Soviet Union’s
massive ground forces, shifted the postwar defence budget in favour
of airpower and atomic strikes. Consequently, SAC was formed in
1946 as an independent offensive command, and USAF founded in
1947 as a service equal to the Army and Navy. The air force had
finally achieved its goal of controlling its own assets, assets which
could now devastate an entire city with a single bomb.3
But things did not go well for SAC at first, and Deaile argues
this was a function of a critical aspect of organisational culture:
leadership. The first commander of SAC, General George Kenny, was
a wartime Pacific theatre tactical—not strategic—air commander
who mismanaged issues of personnel, force structure, training, and
tactics. Kenny was fired in 1948 in favour of the man forever linked
with SAC, Lieutenant-General Curtis LeMay. The tough, blunt,
cigar-chomping—and innovative and results-oriented—LeMay had
a proven record as a bomber commander in both the European
and Pacific theatres, and he recruited like-minded commanders
with similar combat experience. This command group then set
about shaping SAC’s organisational culture around the premise, as
succinctly stated by LeMay, that “‘We are at war now!’” (p. 102)
According to Deaile, “LeMay and his team of ‘bomber generals’ put

On war planning and strategy in this period, see Edward Kaplan, To Kill
Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured
Destruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

3  
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SAC on alert; war was not months or weeks away, but hours away.
SAC’s daily routines reflected an organization at war” (p. 119).4
The next four chapters are the best in the book, and they examine
how SAC became the premier command not just within USAF but
within the US Armed Forces, a force LeMay envisioned as being
“‘so strong and so efficient that no one would dare attack us’” (p.
91). When LeMay took over SAC, he conducted a command-wide
bombing exercise, and not one crew finished the mission as briefed.
He then set about transforming SAC into an elite force that could
deliver on a war plan which required it to destroy the Soviet Union in
one mission. He established realistic and routine training procedures
and missions so that crews achieved and maintained a high level of
readiness and effectiveness; SAC crews joked that every city in the
US had been obliterated many times over through simulated bombing
runs. Checklists encouraged standardised operating procedures for
everything to ensure safety and efficiency. Personnel, who previously
cross-trained on roles and rotated between crews which undermined
proficiency, now specialised in roles and were kept together to create
high performing crews. Crews also competed against each other
in terms of proficiency and bombing accuracy; high performing
crews became lead crews and could be spot promoted while poorer
performing crews were demoted and retrained. And senior officers did
not fly a desk; they flew missions so they had the same experience
as their crews. Constant competition and evaluation—between and
of crews, officers, and units—were key to LeMay’s philosophy of
continual improvement, and his annual surprise inspections were
legendary and cost many officers their commands. Security was
considered equally important, and infiltration teams would try to
penetrate the perimeters of SAC bases to test preparedness, a risky
business considering guards were instructed to shoot to kill.5

Bomber generals would dominate USAF postwar leadership, and it was 1982
before a fighter general became USAF Chief of Staff. On their rivalry, see Mike
Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals: the Problem of Air Force Leadership, 19451982 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1998).
5  
On the formative years of SAC, see Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air
Force (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996); and a
more recent study by Phillip S. Meilinger, Bomber: The Formation and Early Years
of Strategic Air Command (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press,
2012).
4  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

3

Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 11
36

Book Reviews

Deaile points out that the “SAC mentality” took a toll on its
personnel. One of the more interesting chapters of the book is Deaile’s
discussion of the effect of SAC’s organisational culture on the daily
lives of SAC personnel and their wives and families. Despite LeMay’s
(and his wife’s) laudable dedication to providing better pay, food,
health, and accommodation on and off base, and even outlets such as
social and recreational clubs and support groups for SAC personnel
and their families, the reality was that SAC’s drive for excellence
combined with rigid discipline, around the clock operations, and
Arctic and overseas deployments came with a heavy cost in terms of
stress, and SAC had the highest divorce rate in USAF.
Deaile ends his book with the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
when SAC came close to going to war. He describes SAC’s relentless
pace of operations during the crisis, noting that all missions were
performed as trained for without accident or incident. At the height of
the crisis, SAC had 1,436 bombers and 183 missiles on fifteen-minute
attack notice: “SAC personnel had demonstrated what close to fifteen
years of a ‘we are at war’ mentality and culture had produced” (p.
218). Deterrence, based on the credibility of the response, was on full
display. The crisis would mark SAC’s apex, for 1962 was also the first
year since 1946 that it did not have a bomber in production,6 and with
a shift in strategy from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response and
from bombers to missiles,7 by 1968 SAC was reduced in personnel
by almost half. This steady decline continued until 1991 when SAC’s
remaining bombers were taken off alert with the end of the Cold War,
and the command officially ceased to exist a year later. But SAC
lives on in the esprit de corps of its veterans; at annual reunions its
members proudly consider themselves to be victors in a war where
none of them ever dropped a bomb on their intended enemy. Deaile
has written a fitting tribute to their service.
russell isinger , university of saskatchewan

An examination of SAC bomber procurement can be found in Michael E. Brown,
Flying Blind: the Politics of the US Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1992).
7  
Deaile describes missileers—who were not pilots—as a subculture which SAC
worked hard to incorporate into the organisation (so as not to risk them becoming a
counterculture), but his section dealing with the integration of missiles into SAC is
brief and warrants further examination.
6  
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